Proteins are often defined as the molecules that enable life thanks to the special functions they display. But what are proteins’ functions? Despite their relevance in various debates, the answer to this question is often left implicit. This paper argues that a correct characterisation of proteins’ functions must consider the native structure of the protein, building on Bellazzi’s definition of biochemical functions: proteins’ functions are dispositions associated to specific chemical and geometrical structural properties relevant for the tertiary and quaternary structure of proteins, and they contribute to specific evolved biological processes. Section 1 introduces the problem of protein’s functions. Section 2 unpacks the “structure problem” and the “function problem”, where the former inquiries into the function bearer of proteins’ function and the second into the relevant account of function. Section 3 presents an answer to the structure problem by arguing that the focus should be on native structure. Section 4 and Sect. 5 focus on the function problem and the account defended. Section 5 also considers two specific case studies, haemoglobin and crystallins, and a critical evaluation of the account. Section 6 concludes.

Vitamins are important scientific categories in different contexts. This paper argues that vitamins are investigative kinds in middle-range ontologies: categories subject to open-ended investigation and that track features of the world. Section 2 presents the history of vitamin discovery to illustrate how the introduction of the “vitamin” category and subsequent research led to the identification of many different vitamins. Section 3 explores whether vitamins can be considered natural or conventional kinds. Section 4 argues that vitamins are investigative kinds. Section 5 considers the ontology of vitamins as investigative kinds in a middle-range ontology.

In this Philosophy Compass article, I offer an overview of the current debate on the metaphysics of pregnancy in order to further motivate the study of this topic.

This paper is an invited contribution for the Argumenta special issue on Wilson’s 2022 book “Metaphysical emergence” and explores the weak emergence of biochemical functions.

In this paper, we consider (1) how the usage of tools from the philosophy of science, such as weak emergence, can aid our understanding of the relations between the components of complex phenomena, such as erythropoiesis, and (2) how the philosophy of scientific practice sheds light on the explanatory role of processes that are dynamically stabilised and the different levels of organisation implied.

This paper explores functional attribution to biochemical molecules and argues that biochemical functions are dispositional properties that causally contribute to selected biological traits or processes.

This paper argues that the complexity of genetic phenomena supports the weak emergence of molecular genes from the DNA. This account allows to accept genes’ flexibility and context dependency, without compromising their existence.